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WTO DECISION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE 
DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH: A SOLUTION TO THE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 
PROBLEM? 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article assesses recent initiatives designed to address concern that the cost of 
gaining access to essential medicines required to combat epidemics in developing 
countries is prohibitively high.1 This problem is perceived as particularly acute 
because, although fewer than 5 per cent of medicines on the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) Model List of Essential Medicines are patented,2 many new 
drugs, particularly those designed to deal with the most pressing public health crisis of 
modern times, the HIV/AIDS virus, are subject to patent control.3 Many 
commentators fear that the problem of obtaining access to the medicines needed to 
deal with the HIV/AIDS pandemic in developing countries will be further hindered by 
the patent provisions of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement). The concern 
is that, following the end of the transitional arrangements of the TRIPS Agreement in 
2005, the extension of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in all but a few least-
developed countries will lead to unacceptably high prices for medicines in the 
developing world.4  
 
This concern was affirmed in the report of the United Kingdom Commission 
on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), which suggested that if patents were absent in 
developing countries more patients would be able to afford treatment since there is 
considerable evidence that consumption of medicines is sensitive to price.5 But the 
paradox is that, conversely, in the absence of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in 
                                                 
1 For example, World Health Organisation Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health: 
Report by the Secretariat (Geneva: WHO, Fifty-Sixth World Health Assembly Provisional Agenda 
Item 14.9, A56/17, 12 May 2003). 
2 See also World Health Organisation WHO Medicines Strategy: Progress Report (Geneva: WHO, 
Executive Board 111th Session Provisional Agenda Item 10.3, EB111/30, 13 December 2002) at 4. 
3Jacques H.J.Bourgeois and Thaddeus J. Burns ‘Implementing Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health: The Waiver Solution’, 5 (6) Journal of World Intellectual Property 835 
(2002) at 839. E. Noehrenberg ‘TRIPS, the Doha Declaration and Public Health’, 6 (2) Journal of 
World Intellectual Property 379 (2003) at 381. 
4 See also Bourgeois and Burns, above n. 3, at 838; Faizel Ismail ‘The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health and the Negotiations in the WTO on Paragraph 6: Why PhRMA Needs to Join the 
Consensus!’, 6 (3) Journal of World Intellectual Property 393 (2003), at 395; Richard P. Rozek ‘The 
Effects of Compulsory Licensing on Innovation and Access to Health Care’, 3 (6) Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 889 (2000), at 896; Richard P. Rozek and Renee L. Rainey ‘Broad-Based 
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Technologies: Unsound Public Policy’ 4 (4) Journal of 
World Intellectual Property 463 (2001), at 471. 
5Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy, (London: Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002), at 37. See also Department for 
International Development, The UK Government Response to The Report of the Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights “Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy”, 
(London: DFID, 2003), at 5; and criticisms of the CIPR Report by R.S. Crespi, ‘IPRs Under Siege: 
First Impressions of the Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights’, 25 (6) European 
Intellectual Property Review 242 (2003). 
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developing countries, the CIPR report also demonstrated that there may be 
insufficient incentive structures, with the result that investment in private sector 
pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) for diseases that predominantly 
affect developing countries remains low. Less than 5 per cent of the estimated $44 
billion spent on R&D is directed towards developing country diseases, while only 13 
of the 1,393 new drugs approved between 1975 and 1999 are concerned with tropical 
diseases.6 The HIV/AIDS pandemic is particularly problematic in this respect since 
the majority of HIV vaccines are being developed for genetic profiles of subtype B, 
prevalent in developed countries, while most AIDS sufferers in developing countries 
are types A and C, for which far less research is being carried out.7 Yet the overall 
situation remains complex with factors other than patents, such as health care 
provision, research and political commitment in developing countries, also 
constituting significant barriers to access to essential medicines in developing 
countries. The Attaran paper, for instance, argued that patents are not a significant 
barrier to the treatment of HIV/AIDS in Africa, with a variety of other factors such as 
poverty, tariffs and sales taxes and a lack of sufficient international financial aid to 
fund anti-retroviral treatment, being of greater significance.8 
 
This article reviews attempts to find a solution to the problem identified in the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, namely a means of 
ensuring access to low-cost essential medicines in developing countries, which lack 
the manufacturing capacity to take advantage of the compulsory licensing provisions 
of the TRIPS Agreement when faced with public health crises. The article assesses 
progress made in the context of Doha-based negotiations, culminating in the Decision 
of the General Council of the WTO on 30 August 2003. It also highlights the 
significance of developments parallel to the WTO discussions, suggesting that a key 
achievement of the debate on the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health may actually be the extent to which it has refocused attention on the 
severity of the problems faced by developing countries, providing the stimulus for 
wider initiatives designed to tackle the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The article concludes 
that, where real progress on addressing this public health crisis is made, it is likely to 
be in part the result of the 30 August agreement on a mechanism to resolve the Doha 
Declaration compulsory licensing problem. But of equal importance are a mix of 
policy approaches, incremental measures and pragmatic initiatives for which the Doha 
Declaration has provided an important catalyst, such as the actions of corporate 
donors of low-cost (or free) medicines, public-private partnership initiatives and 
increased contributions to the Global Fund by developed countries. Initiatives to 
prevent diversion of trade in low-cost medicines at a regional level, such as the 
European Union (EU) tiered pricing Regulation, also have great potential to assist at a 
pragmatic level. If a mix of policy approaches can assist and operate alongside the 
agreement on a solution to the compulsory licensing problem outlined in the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health by improving access to low-
cost essential medicines and ensuring that drugs remain in the markets for which they 
were intended, there is still great potential to achieve progress in the battle to address 
the public health crises that afflict much of the developing world. 
  
                                                 
6 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, above n. 5, at 32. 
7 Ibid., at 33. 
8Amir Attaran and Lee Gillespie-White ‘Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS 
Treatment in Africa?’, 286 (15) Journal of the American Medical Association 1886 (2001).  
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This article is divided into six parts. The first part sets out the legal context for 
the current debate on access to essential medicines in developing countries by 
reappraising the compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. The 
second part explains why, through increasing public awareness garnered from high 
profile legal disputes, the access to medicines debate came to achieve such 
significance in the public consciousness. The third part reviews the significance of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health as a mechanism for 
acknowledging the severity of the problem. The fourth part reassesses negotiations 
designed to find a solution to the problem identified in the Doha Declaration through 
negotiations at WTO level, culminating in the agreement endorsed by the General 
Council of the WTO on 30 August 2003. The fifth part examines alternatives to a 
Doha-based solution and suggests that these may also be significant, while the sixth 
part concludes by suggesting that, although some of these policy alternatives have not 
received the same degree of attention as Doha-based negotiations, they also have 
great potential to assist in improving access to essential medicines in developing 
countries in the long run. 
 
I.  Compulsory licensing, access to essential medicines and the TRIPS Agreement 
 
On the face of it, the TRIPS Agreement deals adequately with the issue of patents, 
access to essential medicines and public health crises in developing countries through 
Articles 7, 8 and 31. Article 7 provides that the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should contribute not only to the promotion of 
technological innovation but also to the transfer and dissemination of technology to 
the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge9 in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare and which balances rights and 
obligations.10 Further safeguards appear in Article 8(1), which provides that, when 
Members implement the TRIPS Agreement, they may adopt measures necessary to 
protect public health and nutrition and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided such 
measures are consistent with the provisions of the Agreement. 
  
Article 31 refers to ‘other use’, that is to say use other than that permitted 
under Article 30.11 So, although not expressly referred to as compulsory licensing 
provisions, Article 31 allows for ‘use without authorisation’, in effect a compulsory 
licence granted by the competent national authority to allow that national authority or 
a third party to manufacture a patented product without the authorisation of the right 
                                                 
9 In relation to least-developed countries, Article 66(2) also provides that ‘Developed country Members 
shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting 
and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to 
create a sound and viable technological base.’ 
10 Article 7 has generally been interpreted as the promise of foreign direct investment and technology 
transfer to developing countries in return for becoming signatories to the TRIPS Agreement. See, for 
example, Sandra Bartelt ‘Compulsory Licences Pursuant to TRIPS Article 31 in the Light of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’, 6 (2) Journal of World Intellectual Property 
283 (2003), at 286; Paul Vandoren ‘Médicaments sans Frontières? Clarification of the Relationship 
between TRIPS and Public Health resulting from the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration,’ 5 (1) 
Journal of World Intellectual Property 5 (2002), at 8. 
11 Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement is discussed later, in IV.D of this article. 
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holder.12 In this respect, the public interest goal of achieving broader access to the 
patented invention is considered more important than the private interest of the right 
holder in fully exploiting his exclusive rights.13 What this means in the context of 
public health imperatives is that compulsory licensing is intended to permit countries 
to produce generic drugs that are more affordable than patented proprietary 
medicines. Since this amounts to an exception to the exclusive rights of the patent 
holder Article 31 also sets out restrictive conditions that must be satisfied before a 
compulsory licence can be awarded.14 These conditions include, under Article 31(b), a 
requirement that a reasonable period of time is allowed to negotiate a licence with the 
right holder on the basis of reasonable commercial terms, but this requirement of prior 
negotiation and adequate remuneration can be waived in the event of a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.15 So, on the face of it, 
compulsory licences could be granted by a developing country without prior 
negotiation with the holder of rights to key pharmaceutical patents in the case of a 
public health crisis of epidemic proportions. Safeguards on duration of the 
compulsory licence are set out in Article 31 (g), which provides that authorisation for 
such use shall be liable to be terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it 
cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. 
 
However, under Article 31(f), generic drugs produced under a compulsory 
licence ‘shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of 
the Member authorizing such use’.16 This has the practical effect of preventing 
                                                 
12 See also Bartelt, above n. 10, at 288. For a history of compulsory (or ‘non-voluntary’) licensing, with 
particular reference to the Paris Convention of 1883 and subsequent Conferences that attempted to 
amend and clarify compulsory licence provisions in Article 5A of the Paris Convention, see Jerome H. 
Reichman with Catherine Hasenzahl ‘Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical 
Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the United 
States of America’, (Case Study for UNCTAD/ICTSD Capacity Building Project on Intellectual 
Property Rights and Sustainable Development, 2002). For a negotiating history of Article 31 of the 
TRIPS Agreement see E. Richard Gold and Danial K. Lam ‘Balancing Trade in Patents: Public Non-
Commercial Use and Compulsory Licensing’, 6 (1) Journal of World Intellectual Property 5 (2003). 
13 Reichman, above n. 12, at 4. 
14 Although there is disagreement as to whether Article 31 contains an exhaustive list of circumstances 
under which compulsory licences can be granted (for an excellent discussion of this point, see Bartelt, 
above n. 10, at 295 for an analysis, at fn. 64, of the narrow interpretation of Article 31 adopted by 
Rozek, above n. 4, at  904); and Rozek and Rainey, above n. 4, at 468). According to Bartelt, the 
pharmaceutical industry held the opinion that Article 31 should be read as a narrow exception, limiting 
the grounds for compulsory licensing to those expressly mentioned in it. This contrasts with the 
provisions of Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration, which states that each Member has the freedom 
to determine the grounds upon which a compulsory licence can be granted. Bartelt contends that this 
view seems supported by reading Article 31 in conjunction with Article 8, which allows Members to 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic development. In any case, a national emergency is specifically 
mentioned in Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement and the status of public health crises as national 
emergencies was confirmed by Paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration, which specifies that public 
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can 
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
15 For a theoretical and empirical analysis of royalties set under compulsory licences see F.M. Scherer 
and Jayahree Watal ‘Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Nations’, 5 
JIEL 913 (2002). 
16 For a discussion of the meaning of ‘predominantly’ within the context of Article 31(f), see Frederick 
M. Abbott ‘Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs: the TRIPS Agreement at the WTO after 
the Doha Declaration on Public Health’, Quaker United Nations Office – Geneva, Occasional Paper 9 
(2002), at 26. 
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exports of generic drugs to countries that do not have significant pharmaceutical 
industries themselves.17 Only about a dozen developing countries, among them China, 
India, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa have the level of manufacturing capacity 
capable of producing significant quantities of off-patent generic drugs. For countries 
with insufficient manufacturing capacity, the only realistic sourcing mechanism is 
importation. Under the transitional arrangements of the TRIPS Agreement, 
developing countries can currently buy generic drugs from a few producers in 
countries such as India, but they will be unable to do so after 1 January 2005 when, 
under transitional arrangements set out in Article 65(4), developing countries will be 
required to extend product patent protection to areas of technology not protected on 
the general date of application of the TRIPS Agreement.18 This Article 31(f) problem 
will be exacerbated from 2005 by the fact that a WTO Member experiencing a public 
health crisis will be unable to import generic pharmaceutical products under 
compulsory licensing conditions from other Member unless the latter country has also 
invoked an equivalent compulsory licence and, in any case, since Article 31(f) 
specifies that manufacture must be ‘predominantly’ for supply of the domestic market 
in the manufacturing Member country rather than for export, any assistance of this 
kind from another country is likely to be limited.19 
 
II. Increasing public awareness: the access to essential medicines debate 
 
The potential impact of the TRIPS Agreement on access to essential medicines was 
brought sharply into focus in March 2001 in South Africa,20 when forty-one global 
pharmaceutical companies, represented by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of South Africa, objected to provisions of the South African Medicines 
Act, which gave the Health Minister the power to grant compulsory licences for 
patented pharmaceutical products when public health was at stake.21 The legal action 
brought, but subsequently abandoned, by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of South Africa concerned, in particular, Article 10 of the South African 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 1997, which added 
Section 15C to the 1965 Medicines and Related Substances Control Act,22 in doing so 
allowing the Health Minister to abrogate patents, issue compulsory licences and allow 
                                                 
17 Concept Paper Relating to Paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, Communication from the EC and their Member States to the TRIPS Council, 
IP/C/W/339, 4 March 2002. See also Frederick F. Abbott ‘The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines 
and the WTO Doha Ministerial Conference’, Quaker United Nations Office – Geneva, Occasional 
Paper 7 (2001), at 13; Bartelt, above n. 10, at 284, 296. 
18 See also Bourgeois and Burns, above n. 3, at 838. 
19 See also Arvind Subramanian ‘The AIDS Crisis, Differential Pricing of Drugs, and the TRIPS 
Agreement’ 4 (3) Journal of World Intellectual Property 323 (2001), at 326. 
20 South Africa had already adopted measures necessary to comply with the TRIPS Agreement by 
virtue of the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act No. 38 of 1997. 
21 See Notice of Motion in the High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division) Case No. 
4183/98, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharmasuit.html (visited 3 June 2003). 
22 Section 15C: ‘The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in 
certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public and, in particular may: (a) 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patent Act 1978 (Act No. 57 of 1978), 
determine that the rights with regard to any medicine under a patent granted in the Republic shall not 
extend to acts in respect of such medicine…’. (Bartelt, above n. 10, at 291, fn. 49, quoting Amendment 
Act reprinted in Tshimanga Kongolo ‘Public Interest versus the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Monopoly 
in South Africa’, 4 (5) Journal of World Intellectual Property 605 (2001), at 605). 
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parallel imports of pharmaceutical products in order to increase availability and lower 
the cost of medicines.23 
 
In terms of the TRIPS Agreement, what the South African legislation lacked 
were the detailed provisions required by Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
particularly the requirement that compulsory licensing be granted only on a non-
exclusive and non-assignable basis, with the possibility of judicial review and with 
adequate remuneration for the patent holder.24 But the compatibility of the South 
African compulsory licensing provisions with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 
was difficult to ascertain conclusively since the exceptions in the South African 
Amendment Act are considered ambiguous.25 The case proved particularly emotive 
because access to anti-retroviral drugs for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, such as AZT 
(Zidovudine), was constrained in South Africa by the prohibitively high price of those 
medicines. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa ultimately 
abandoned the threat of court action in the face of intense public pressure. But by then 
the case had brought the access to essential medicines debate to the fore in public 
consciousness. South Africa, with an estimated 4.5 million citizens infected with HIV, 
has since become the focus of widespread concern due to its own government’s 
unconventional treatment policies. In August 2003, South African Health Minister 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang reiterated the government’s refusal to implement an anti-
retroviral drugs programme, proposing instead that HIV/AIDS sufferers eat garlic, 
onions, olive oil and African potatoes to boost their immune systems. 
 
The controversial nature of compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement was reinforced by WTO dispute settlement proceedings initiated by the 
United States26 against Brazil a few months later in June 2001.27 The US complaint 
was that Article 68 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law (Law 9.279/96), which 
permitted the granting of a compulsory licence where there is a lack of local 
manufacturing of the patented product, was incompatible with the principle of non-
discrimination set out in Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. However, in the face 
of criticism from the international community, the United States ultimately withdrew 
its complaint to the WTO and notified a Mutually Agreed Solution28 on 19 July 2001, 
following Brazil’s commitment to hold prior talks to permit constructive discussion 
should Brazil consider it necessary to use Article 68 of the national industrial property 
law to grant a compulsory licence on patents held by US companies.29  
 
But, while an appreciation of the potential of compulsory licensing as a public 
policy tool in developing countries appeared to be growing following the South 
                                                 
23 Kongolo, above n. 22, at 875; R.L. Ostergard, ‘The Political Economy of the South Africa-United 
States Patent Dispute’, 2 (6) Journal of World Intellectual Property, 875 (1999), at 612. 
24 Frank Wooldridge ‘Affordable Medicines – TRIPS and United States Policies’, 4 (1) Intellectual 
Property Quarterly 103 (2000), at 108. 
25 Bartelt, above n. 10, at 292. 
26 Request for consultations by the United States, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, 
WT/DS199/1, 8 June 2001. 
27 See also Daya Shanker, ‘Brazil, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the WTO’, 5 (1) Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 52 (2002) 53. 
28 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection, 
WT/DS/199/4, 19 July 2001. 
29 Vandoren, above n. 10, at 7. See also Daya Shanker, above n. 27, at 53. 
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African and Brazilian cases,30 there were also countervailing concerns that the 
aggressive use of compulsory licences to address public health imperatives in 
developing countries may obscure the potential of more innovative policy 
instruments, such as encouraging foreign direct investment into local manufacturing 
facilities and discouraging foreign direct investment and technology transfer to 
developing countries.31 Rozek and Rainey, for instance, have warned against the 
potentially harmful effects in developing countries that adopt a broad-based 
compulsory licensing regime as a means by which developing countries can gain 
access to patented pharmaceutical products on grounds that compulsory licensing 
destroys the incentives for research and development on diseases specific to 
developing countries, that it imposes costs on national governments faced with having 
to approve and monitor the products produced under licence, and because compulsory 
licensing may encourage a culture of widespread illegal copying of patented products 
in developed country markets.32 
 
But, as Rozek and Rainey themselves acknowledge, in many respects the real 
value of compulsory licensing can be found not in its actual use, but in the mere threat 
of its use – a mechanism used successfully by Brazil in negotiations with 
pharmaceutical companies to negotiate an affordable price for anti-retroviral drugs for 
the treatment of HIV/AIDS.33 This leverage role for compulsory licensing has also 
been observed in the US, where legislation broadly authorises the government and its 
contractors to make use of patented inventions without the patentee’s permission and 
without access to injunctive relief to prevent infringement and where a number of 
statutes also allow private compulsory licences on specific public health grounds.34 In 
their negotiations with Bayer over acquisition of large quantities of Ciprofloxacin 
(Cipro) to address the threat posed by the anthrax virus, for example, the United 
States successfully negotiated a lower price for Cipro in the face of possible 
compulsory licences.35 Overall, what the recent experiences of Brazil and the United 
States demonstrate is that the mere threat of compulsory licences may often be as, if 
not more, effective in achieving public policy objectives than actual use.36  
 
III.  The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
 
WTO Members adopted the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
at the 4th Ministerial Conference in Doha on 14 November 2001 in response to 
concerns about higher prices for patented drugs and the use of compulsory licences, 
particularly the requirement that they be issued in accordance with Article 31 and 
                                                 
30 See, for example, reports that the NGO Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech) has recently 
been ‘coaching’ groups in South Africa, Ghana, Uganda and Kenya to mount legal bids for compulsory 
licences: ‘Africa’s Aids Drugs Trapped in the Laboratory. Kenya has the pills. Now the fight is on to 
get them to the people’, Rory Carroll, The Guardian, 21 May 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,960106,00.html (visited 22 May 2003). 
31 Reichman, above n. 12, at 26-27. 
32 Rozek and Rainey, above n. 4, at 464. 
33 See also Bartelt, above n. 10, at 307; Vandoren, above n. 10 at  9. 
34 Reichman, above n. 12, at 10. 
35 See also Frederick M. Abbott, ‘The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: 
Lighting A Dark Corner’, 5 (2) JIEL 469 (2002), at 486. 
36 See also Reichman, above n. 12, at 13. 
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should be predominantly for domestic use.37 The Doha Declaration, originally an 
initiative of the African Group of WTO Members38 and a ‘concrete success’ for 
developing countries,39 recognised the gravity of the public health problems afflicting 
many developing and least-developed countries especially those resulting from 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics. It stressed the need for the 
TRIPS Agreement to be part of wider national and international action to address 
these problems. It reaffirmed that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not 
prevent measures to protect public health and that the TRIPS Agreement should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ rights to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. The 
Declaration recognised the flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement with 
respect to the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which such licences are granted; the right of each Member to determine 
what constitutes a ‘national emergency’ or other circumstances of extreme 
emergency, it being understood that public health crises can represent a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme emergency;40 and the effect of 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that allow each Member freedom to establish its 
own regime for exhaustion of intellectual property rights.41  
 
But the main problem was that the compulsory licensing provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement were of little practical use to countries with little or no 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities, since developing countries could not 
import from other Members with manufacturing capacity until the second Member 
had also invoked a compulsory licence and that even then the second Member would 
fall foul of Article 31(f) because the compulsory licence would have to be 
‘predominantly for the supply of the domestic market’ of the Member granting the 
licence.42 In recognition of this problem, paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
explicitly recognised that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use 
of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. Paragraph 6 set a deadline of 
the end of 2002 by which the Council for TRIPS (hereafter the TRIPS Council) was 
instructed to find an expeditious solution to this problem and report to the General 
Council of the WTO. Overall, then, the text of the Doha Declaration was interpretive 
in nature and designed to reaffirm the flexibilities already contained in the provisions 
of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.43 
 
                                                 
37 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2,14 
November 2001. 
38 According to Tshimanga Kongolo ‘TRIPS, the Doha Declaration and Public Health’, 6 (2) Journal of 
World Intellectual Property 373 (2003), at 374. 
39 Peter Drahos ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting’, 5 (5) 
Journal of World Intellectual Property 765 (2002) at 781. 
40 This rectifies the misguided notion that Members must proclaim a fully-fledged national emergency 
in order to grant compulsory licences for patented pharmaceutical products under Article 31 
(Reichman, above n. 12, at 15). 
41 According to the doctrine of international exhaustion, patented pharmaceutical products placed on 
the market at low prices in developing countries can be re-sold and exported to other countries under 
the doctrine of international exhaustion (see also Reichman, above n. 12, at 15). 
42 Bartelt, above n. 10, at 296. 
43 Noehrenberg, above n. 3, at 379. See also Alan O. Sykes ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing 
Countries, and the Doha “Solution”’, John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 140  
(2002), at 9. 
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What of the legal status of the Declaration? When disputes arise over 
measures taken by Members on public health grounds, Vandoren claims that the 
Declaration can be used to argue that the panel should interpret the TRIPS Agreement 
in a manner supportive of a Member’s right to protect public health.44 Bartelt also 
suggests that, by virtue of Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention, the Doha 
Declaration should be regarded as ‘subsequent practice in application of the treaty’ 
because paragraph 5(a) of the Declaration gives clear guidelines for interpretation, 
stating that the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose 
of the Agreement as expressed, in particular its objectives and principles.45 However, 
Reichman offers a word of caution, acknowledging that Article 31(3) of the Vienna 
Convention may apply, but also stressing that the precise legal status of the Doha 
Declaration does remain uncertain, the practical implication being uncertainty as to 
the extent to which future WTO panels and the Appellate Body will draw guidance 
from the Declaration when deciding upon complaints.46 
  
IV.  Negotiations on possible solutions 
 
In an attempt to resolve the issues identified in paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, 
negotiations between WTO Members, meeting within the TRIPS Council, took place 
throughout 2002 and 2003, culminating in the agreement endorsed by the General 
Council of the WTO on 30 August 2003. When the TRIPS Council met in June 2002, 
five Communications had been submitted by WTO Members proposing paragraph 6 
solutions,47 with two further communications from the WTO Secretariat, providing 
available information on the existence of patents in regard to diseases referred to in 
the Doha Declaration and on the manufacturing capacity of medicines.48 As with the 
earlier negotiations on the text of the TRIPS Agreement, the US and European Union 
were extremely active in support of their pharmaceutical industries.49 However, unlike 
the original TRIPS negotiations, the process prompted by paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration was also marked by a far greater degree of involvement on the part of 
developing countries, supported by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).50 
                                                 
44 Vandoren, above n. 10, at 8. 
45 Bartelt, above n. 10, at 302. 
46 Reichman, above n. 12, at 14. 
47 Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, above n 17; Proposal on 
Paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Joint 
Communication from the African Group of the WTO, IP/C/W/351, 24 June 2002; Paragraph 6 of the 
Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Communication from the United 
Arab Emirates, IP/C/W/354, 24 June 2002; Paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, Communication received from the Permanent Mission of Brazil on 
behalf of the delegations of Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, China , the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela, IP/C/W/355, 24 June 2002; Paragraph 
6 of the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Second Communication 
from the United States, IP/C/W/358, 9 July 2002. 
48 Available Information on the Existence of Patents in Regard to Diseases Referred to in the 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Note by the Secretariat, WTO, Geneva, 
IP/C/W/348, 11 June 2002; Available Information on Manufacturing Capacity for Medicines, Note by 
the Secretariat, WTO, Geneva, IP/C/W/345, 24 May 2002. 
49 For a comparison of US and EU TRIPS negotiating strategies, see Duncan Matthews, ‘Globalising 
Intellectual Property Rights: The TRIPS Agreement’, (London: Routledge, 2002) 29-45. 
50 Susan K. Sell, ‘TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign’, paper prepared for ‘Access to 
Medicines for the Developing World: International Facilitation or Hindrance?’ Conference sponsored 
by the University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison, Wisconsin, 9-10 March 2002, at 15, has 
identified the higher profile role of NGOs from civil society in the post-TRIPS debate as being largely 
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A.  Dispute settlement moratorium 
 
As for the negotiations, in June 2002 the African Group proposed a moratorium on 
bringing complaints against low-income developing countries before the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the WTO in relation to Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement.51 A 
month later the United States also put forward proposals for a moratorium,52 an offer 
later acted upon by the US in December 2002 as a measure to provide developing 
countries with temporary relief from dispute settlement actions following failure to 
meet the paragraph 6 deadline of the Doha Declaration.53 The advantage of a 
moratorium was that it would set aside any WTO dispute settlement proceedings that 
might otherwise arise for breach of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement through the 
production and export of pharmaceutical products to a third country in order to 
address a public health crisis in the latter.54 However, since there was arguably no 
sound legal basis for not applying the dispute settlement procedure in instances of a 
moratorium55 there was a risk that, even as a temporary arrangement, a moratorium on 
disputes against Members that take action to address public health crises in countries 
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities was likely to have the inherent 
problem of lacking legal certainty as to the behaviour of potential complainants, 
particularly developed country WTO Members.56 
 
There was also the problem that implicit in the moratorium is the proviso that 
it would apply only if developing countries compensate patent holders for compulsory 
licences, and only until the expected end date of the Doha Development Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations in January 2005, when the transitional arrangements for 
developing countries under Article 65(4) of the TRIPS Agreement will also come to 
an end. With the prospect of a temporary solution of the kind offered by a moratorium 
lasting only until the end of the Doha Round, the likelihood was that trade-offs and 
package deals would emerge, as they did during the original TRIPS negotiations, with 
developing countries offered trade advantages and market access in key areas, such as 
                                                                                                                                            
attributable to the work of the organisations such as Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech), a US-
based NGO focusing on information technologies, intellectual property and research and development, 
and Health Action International (HAI) a global network of health, development, consumer and other 
public interest groups, based in the Netherlands. CPTech and HAI have been active in the debate 
surrounding patents, access to medicines and public health since the mid-1990s. Meanwhile, Peter 
Drahos, above n. 39, has identified NGOs as having had a crucial role in the rise of influence of the 
Africa Group, both in relation to public health and biodiversity issues. In particular, the Quaker UN 
Office has also played a key role in the public health debate through the work of its consultant Geoff 
Tansey and the influential report it commissioned from Frederick Abbott, above n. 17, in the run-up to 
the Doha Ministerial Meeting, which itself reflected the comments of James Love and Ellen ‘T Hoen of 
NGOs CPTech and MSF respectively, together with academics Carlos Correa and Jerome Reichman. 
Oxfam has also been active through the work of Ruth Mayne and briefing papers such as ‘TRIPS and 
Public Health: the next battle’, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/15trips/15trips.html (visited 25 
April 2003). 
51 Proposal on Paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO, IP/C/W/351, 24 June 2002, para. 6(g). 
52 Second Communication from the United States, above n. 47. 
53 US Announces Interim Plan to Help Poor Countries Fight HIV/AIDS and Other Health Crises in 
Absence of WTO Consensus’, USTR Press Release: http://www.ustr.gov.releases/2002/12/02-119.htm 
(visited 21 December 2002). 
54 Kongolo, above n. 22, at  377. 
55 Bourgeois and Burns, above n. 3, at 851. 
56 See also Bourgeois and Burns, above n. 3, at 852; Ismail, above n. 4, at 400. 
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agriculture, in return for agreeing to the more restrictive interpretation of Article 31(f) 
proposed by developed countries.  
 
B.  Waiver of Article 31(f) pursuant to Article IX.3 of the WTO Agreement 
 
As an alternative to the moratorium approach, the United States suggested57 that 
WTO Members facing a public health crisis but lacking domestic manufacturing 
capacity could be granted a waiver of Article 31(f) to allow manufacture and export 
under a compulsory licence within the territory of another Member, at least until a 
definitive solution to paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration has been put in place.58 A 
waiver could be achieved by means of Article IX.3-4 of the WTO Agreement, under 
the terms of which the Ministerial Conference can waive an obligation imposed on a 
Member by the TRIPS Agreement in ‘exceptional circumstances’. It was envisaged 
that the waiver would not be limited by duration, provided it is reviewed on an annual 
basis by consensus or a three-fourths vote, following a request for a waiver, made to 
the TRIPS Council by the Member concerned.59 The request for a waiver from a 
developing country would initially be submitted to the TRIPS Council, following 
which the Ministerial Conference may approve the waiver by consensus or a three 
quarters vote. Since a waiver would be temporary, it would have the advantage over a 
permanent amendment of the TRIPS Agreement that it would not require the approval 
of parliamentary bodies within WTO Members and could be tailored to the specific 
objectives of the public health crisis in question.60 
 
C.  Amendment to Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement to allow exports of products 
produced under compulsory licence 
 
Procedurally, an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement to deal with the crux of the 
compulsory licensing problem, (namely the requirement under Article 31(f) that 
compulsory licences be ‘predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the 
Member authorising such use’), could be achieved, in accordance with Article X.1 of 
the WTO Agreement, by a consensus or a two-thirds majority of the Ministerial 
Conference. As proposed by the Communication from the European Communities 
(EC) and their Member States of 4 March 2002,61 such an amendment could, for 
example, state that in exceptional circumstances, Article 31(f) would not apply to 
compulsory licences granted by a Member for the purpose of supplying another 
Member with a product necessary to address a public health crisis, provided that 
measures were put in place to avoid abuses, re-exportation and trade diversion.62 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Second Communication from the United States, above n. 47. 
58 See also Abbott, above n. 17, at 32; Bourgeois and Burns, above n. 3, at 853; Bartelt, above n. 10, at 
298; Thomas A. Haag ‘TRIPS Since Doha: How Far Will the WTO Go Toward Modifying the Terms 
of Compulsory Licensing?’, 84 (12) Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 945 (2002), at  
969; Kongolo, above n. 22, at 377 
59 Articles IX.3 and IX: 4 of the WTO Agreement. See also Bourgeois and Burns, above n 5, at 856. 
60 See also Abbott, above n. 16, at 20.  
61 Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, above n. 17, paras 18-19. 
62 See also Bourgeois and Burns, above n. 3, at 846; Bartelt, above n. 10, at 299; Haag, above n. 58, at 
970. 
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   1.  Scope of exemptions from Article 31(f) 
 
On 6 November 2002 the EC and their Member States, in compromise proposals 
ahead of the Sydney WTO Mini-Ministerial Meeting on 14-15 November 2002, 
reiterated the main elements of their Communication of 4 March 2002 by again 
advocating an amendment to Article 31(f) to allow exports of products produced 
under compulsory licence. By way of safeguarding against abuse, the EC’s 6 
November document also proposed that any solution allowing an exemption to the 
Article 31(f) requirement that generic drugs produced under a compulsory licence to 
be ‘predominantly’ for domestic use should be limited to the production of medicines 
where the gravity of public health problems afflict developing and least-developed 
countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics. Product coverage would include patented pharmaceuticals and diagnostic 
test kits needed to address public health problems. 
 
But the US adopted a more restrictive approach. In late 2002, Assistant United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) for Africa, Rosa Whitaker, wrote to all African 
countries, urging them to support the US position.63 The Whitaker letter insisted that 
an exemption be limited to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria with no scope for 
‘other epidemics’ to be included. The US view was that broadening the exemption to 
cover any ‘other epidemics’, in keeping with the wording of the Doha Declaration, 
would risk the inclusion of ‘lifestyle’ illnesses such as obesity or the common cold 
that should not be excluded from the compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement. NGOs criticised the US approach on grounds that half of the victims of 
non-communicable diseases (cardiovascular diseases, cancer, diabetes, chronic 
respiratory diseases etc.) were from the developing world, where access to expensive 
patented pharmaceutical products remained limited. The Whitaker letter also argued 
against allowing the full range of health care products (including diagnostic kits as 
well as actual medicines themselves) to fall within a paragraph 6 solution, as the EC 
suggested, on grounds that this would divert attention from access to medicines. 
  
   2.  Differentiating between developing countries 
 
In a move that proposed the introduction of a new distinction between different types 
of developing country, previously undifferentiated in the TRIPS Agreement, the EC 
and US both took the view that countries benefiting from the exception should be 
limited to least-developed countries and nations classified by the World Bank as low-
income developing countries.64 High-income developing countries would be able to 
benefit from the exemption only if the low-cost medicines were needed to address 
situations of ‘national emergency or extreme urgency’.65 Eligible countries would also 
have to show that they have no, or insufficient, manufacturing capacity in the drugs 
sector (i.e. no plants manufacturing active ingredients) and that they would not be 
able to create such capacities in the short term. NGOs criticised the proposal to 
                                                 
63 See The Washington Post, ‘Drugs for the Poor’, 14 November 2002, A32. 
64 Article 65 (2)-(5), TRIPS Agreement. 
65 According to the World Bank classification of high-income countries among non-OECD economies 
are: Brunei, French Polynesia, Guam, Hong Kong China, Macao China, New Caledonia, N. Mariana 
Islands, Singapore and Taiwan, Slovenia, Andorra, Channel Islands, Cyprus, Faroe Islands, Greenland, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Aruba, Bahamas, Bermuda, 
Cayman Islands, Netherlands Antilles, and Virgin Islands. 
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restrict the exemption to low-income economies on grounds that this condition denied 
equal rights of access to generic medicines for at least 72 developing countries that 
could not, with the probable exception of China, produce these generic versions of the 
new drugs for themselves, nor do so at a reasonable price. 
 
EC and US proposals that would have prevented high-income developing 
countries from benefiting from the new rules were also criticised by developing 
countries, including Brazil, India, South Africa, Kenya, Thailand, China and Egypt. 
These countries argued that proposals by the developed nations amounted to an 
attempt to differentiate among the potential beneficiary countries to an extent not 
agreed upon by paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, which simply refers to countries 
with ‘insufficient or no manufacturing capacities’. The developing countries argued 
that all WTO Members should be allowed to judge for themselves whether they meet 
these criteria. 
 
   3.  Exporting countries 
 
Another major sticking point arose over which countries should be allowed to qualify 
as exporters of low-cost essential medicines. While the EC proposed that all WTO 
Members should qualify, the Whitaker letter confirmed the US position that exporter 
status under the exemption should be limited to least-developed and developing 
countries as a means of encouraging investment in their domestic pharmaceutical 
industries.66 Permitting developed countries to be exporters would, in the opinion of 
the US, simply hinder technology transfer and pharmaceutical company investment in 
the developing world.  
 
This US proposal was criticised by NGOs as having the effect of reducing the 
number of potential suppliers of generic medicines that would be able to produce low-
cost medicines. The main problem with this solution was that the company supplying 
cheap generic drugs would have to ask the government of its own country to override 
the relevant patent before any export could take place.67 This would make the 
importing country dependent on the political will of another government and 
potentially increase the administrative cost burden.  
 
The African Group signalled flexibility on possible safeguards imposed on the 
country making the generic drug. They proposed that safeguards could include a 
requirement to export all of the production to the country issuing the licence and to 
require special labelling of the drug. But they argued that proposals to require special 
colouring and shaping of pills might increase production costs and should be avoided. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 See also Second Communication from the United States, above n. 47, para 15. 
67 Abbott has suggested overcoming the problems created by Article 31(f) by creating ‘streamlined 
parallel compulsory licensing arrangements’ (Abbott, above n. 16, at 28) under which a country of 
export might choose to recognise the grant of a compulsory licence issued by an importing country by 
issuing a parallel grant of a compulsory licence in the country of export, but this has the drawback that 
the exporting country faces the limitation imposed by Article 31(f) requiring compulsory licences to be 
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market authorising such use. 
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D.  Interpretation of the ‘limited exceptions’ clause of Article 30 
 
One provision of the TRIPs Agreement that potentially offered an opportunity to 
make generic drugs readily available in developing countries was Article 30.68 Under 
Article 30, ‘Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with 
a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties.’ The Article 30 mechanism could therefore be used to authorise the making 
and export of patented public health related products to developing countries, where 
this is undertaken to fulfil unmet public health needs in countries of import.69 
 
Although the United States consistently argued for a strict interpretation of 
Article 30,70 it was suggested by other WTO Members that a broader interpretation 
would allow Article 30 to introduce a specific exception for the purposes of supplying 
another Member that had granted a compulsory licence for a specific pharmaceutical 
product.71 In its Communication of 4 March 2002, the EC and its Member States 
proposed that ‘WTO Members could adopt a declaration stating that a WTO Member 
may, in accordance with Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, provide that the 
manufacture, on its territory, of a patented product, without authorisation of the right 
holder, is lawful when it is meant to supply another country which has granted a 
licence for the import and sale of the product concerned in its territory in order to deal 
with a serious public health problem’.72 This view was supported by Brazil, making a 
submission to the TRIPS Council on behalf of a group of developing countries which, 
in June 2002, argued that Article 30 should be interpreted to recognise the right of 
WTO Members to authorise third parties to address the public health needs in another 
country, without the consent of the patent holder.73 By this time, however, the EC and 
its Member States had cooled on an Article 30 solution,74 questioning its legal merits 
due to doubts about whether the criteria of Article 30 offer sufficient scope for an 
authoritative interpretation.75 The EC’s shift was reportedly criticised by NGOs.76 
 
                                                 
68 Particularly in the light of paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration, which provides that: ‘We agree that 
the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public 
health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the 
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' 
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.’ 
69 See also Abbott, above n. 16, at 6; Abbott, above n. 17, at 33. 
70 See, for example, Second Communication from the United States, above n. 47. See also see also 
Haag, above n. 58, at 960. 
71 See also Bartelt, above n. 10, at 299; Daya Shanker, Access to Medicines, Article 30 of TRIPS in the 
Doha Declaration and an Anthropological Critique of International Treaty Negotiations, 2003, mimeo, 
at 28. 
72 Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, above n. 17, para 24. 
73 Paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
Communication received from the Permanent Mission of Brazil on behalf of Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, 
China, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and 
Venezuela, IP/C/W/355, 24 June 2002. 
74 Communication from the EC and their Member States to the TRIPS Council Relating to Paragraph 6 
of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/352, 20 June 2002. 
75 Haag, above n. 58, at 957. 
76 According to Bourgeois and Burns, above n. 3, at 842. 
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Despite the cooling of enthusiasm on the part of the EC and their Member 
States, on 23 October 2002 an EU institution, the European Parliament (EP) adopted, 
(during the first reading of the draft Directive to update Directive 2001/83/EC relating 
to medicinal products for human use), proposals for an Article 30 solution in the form 
of Amendment 196.77 Amendment 196 stated that: ‘Manufacturing shall be allowed if 
the medicinal product is intended for export to a third country that has issued a 
compulsory licence for that product, or where a patent is not in force and if there is a 
request to that effect of the competent public health authorities of that third country.’ 
Amendment 196, which was consistent with contemporaneous proposals by the 
WHO,78 set out a basic framework for a solution to the paragraph 6 problem by 
allowing generic manufacturers in any country to supply consumers in any country, so 
long as the sale of that product was legal and appropriate in the country where it was 
used by patients, and so long as the legitimate rights, if any, of the patent owners, 
were protected in the country where the product was consumed. Doubts have already 
been raised, however, about the extent to which circumstances can amount to a 
‘limited exception’ within the meaning of Article 30 following the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Panel Decision on Sections 55.2(1) and (2) of the Canadian Patent Act.79 
  
For Haag,80 neither the narrower permissive interpretation of Article 30 
proposed by the EC nor the broader authoritative interpretation advanced by 
developing countries are tenable solutions as they are inconsistent with the statutory 
construction of the TRIPS Agreement, its legislative history and an interpretation of 
Article 30 provided by the Dispute Settlement Body in the Canada – Patent 
Protection.81 
 
The Panel Report in Canada – Patent Protection provided some guidance for 
the application of Article 30, indicating that a compulsory licence issued under Article 
30 must meet three cumulative conditions, which must all be satisfied for the 
exception to fall within the scope of Article 30. First, the exception must be of a 
limited nature;82 second, it may not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the patent; and, third, it may not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the patent holder, taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties.83 
                                                 
77http://www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/calendar?APP=PDF&TYPE=PV2&FILE=p0021023E
N.pdf&LANGUE=EN (visited 7 November 2002). 
78  In its statement to the TRIPS Council on 20 September 2002, the WHO argued that ‘Among the 
solutions being proposed, the limited exception under Article 30 is the most consistent with this public 
health principle. This solution will give WTO Members expeditious authorisation, as requested by the 
Doha Declaration, to permit third parties to make, sell and export medicines and other health 
technologies to address public health needs’. See also ‘Implications of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’, WHO/EDM/PAR/2002.3. 
79 WTO Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada - Patent 
Protection), WT/DS114/R, adopted 17 March 2000. See also Abbott, above n. 16, at 43; Skyes, above 
n. 43, at 6. 
80  Haag, above n. 58, at 947. 
81 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection, above n. 79, 
82 For criticism of the Panel’s failure to consider properly the meaning of the word ‘limited’ see Robert 
Howse, ‘The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times’, 3 (4) 
Journal of World Intellectual Property 493 (2000), at 498. 
83 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection, above n. 79, para 7.20. See also Bartelt, above n. 10 at 
300; Haag, above n. 58, at 962; Howse, above n. 82, at 499; Dara Williams, ‘Developing  TRIPS 
Jurisprudence: The First Six Years and Beyond, 4 (2) Journal of World Intellectual Property 177 
(2001), at 186. 
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In Canada – Patent Protection the Panel, making general reference to the 
goals and limitations set out in Articles 7 and 8(1) of the TRIPS Agreement and the 
negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement,84 adopted a strict textual approach to the 
meaning of Article 30,85 stressing the limited nature of the exception.86 In particular, 
the Panel pointed out that the language of Article 30 mirrors the language of Article 
13 of the TRIPS Agreement, which in turn derives its wording from Article 9(2) of 
the Berne Convention and provides an exception to copyrights for fair-use.87 The 
implication was that, although dealing with a different category of intellectual 
property rights, Article 30 offers similar exceptions for the granting of compulsory 
licensing on health grounds.88 Section 55.2(2) of the Canadian Patent Act, authorising 
the manufacture and storage of patented pharmaceuticals by a third party without 
authorisation of the patentee with the intention of placing the patented products on the 
market upon expiration of the relevant patent (the ‘stockpiling’ provision), therefore 
did not constitute a ‘limited exception’ to patent rights under Article 30.89 
 
Following the Panel decision in Canada – Patent Protection, there are doubts 
as to whether a compulsory licence to manufacture and supply generic drugs to 
another WTO Member could be justified under Article 30 since it would be unlikely 
to meet the requirement of not conflicting with the normal exploitation of the patent, 
since compulsory licensing could be described as being ‘diametrically opposed to the 
subject-matter of the patent, which is to reward the inventor for his creative efforts’.90 
However Bartelt suggests that the circumstances might be rather different were 
Article 30 interpreted in the light of Articles 7 and 8(1), and points out that the 
Canada Panel has been criticised for not mentioning explicitly these provisions.91 
 
Procedurally, a declaration on the interpretation of Article 30 could be issued 
by the General Council under the provisions of Article IX.2 of the WTO Agreement. 
Article IX.2 provides that, after a recommendation by the Council, the decision to 
adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members.92 
The principle advantage of this declaration on the interpretation of Article 30 over an 
amendment of Article 31(f) is that it would not require time-consuming further 
ratification by national parliaments. However, this would still leave the problem that 
Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement clearly states that a patent shall confer on its 
owner the right ‘to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts 
of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing’ the patented product and 
                                                 
84 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection, above n. 79, para. 7.29. 
85 Howse, above n. 82, at 496, is critical of the Panel’s ‘resort to the negotiating history of the TRIPS 
Agreement a source of treaty interpretation which, according to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, 
may only be used in the case of the application of the interpretive sources that are obligatory under 
Article 31, including the purpose, object and context of the treaty, results in ambiguity or absurdity’. 
86 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection, above n. 79, para. 7.31. 
87 Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protection, above n. 79,para. 7.71. 
88 See also Haag, above n. 58, at  961; Howse, above n. 82, at 502; Williams, above n. 83, at 187. 
89 The Panel’s lack of explicit reference to Articles 7 and 8 in its reasoning has been criticised by 
commentators on the outcome of this dispute (see Williams, above n. 83, at 191 and 208). 
90 Bartelt, above n. 10, at 300; see also Haag, above n. 58, at 965. 
91 Bartelt, above n. 10, at 300, see also Williams, above n. 83, at 191. 
92 See also Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, above n. 17, 
para 30; Bourgeois and Burns, above n. 3, at 842; Bartelt, above n. 10, at 301. 
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that the mere fact that the importing country met the conditions to grant a compulsory 
licence does not justify the breach of the patent holder’s rights in a third country.93 
 
Overall, what these proposals to address the Article 31(f) ‘problem’ were 
seeking to achieve was ‘overcoming traditional concepts of compulsory licences 
which focused mainly on the domestic market in accordance with the principle of 
territoriality’.94 
 
E.  Chairman’s draft 
 
By the closing months of 2002, debate had become stymied by disagreement over the 
issue of which illnesses and medicines should be covered by an exception, which 
countries should be allowed to benefit from the exception, which countries should be 
allowed to produce generic equivalents of patented medicines for export, and whether 
the TRIPS Agreement should be formally amended. 
 
Ambassador Eduardo Perez Motta, Chairman of the TRIPS Council, attempted 
to achieve progress with a compromise text on 16 December 2002, under which the 
TRIPS Agreement would be amended so that any country with manufacturing 
capacities could export, while developing countries without manufacturing capacities 
in the pharmaceutical sector would be allowed to benefit from this system in the face 
of public health problems.95 Countries with sufficient capacity and/or financial means 
would not be able to use the exemption system, since this would only divert resources 
away from those countries that need it most. Developed and high-income developing 
countries would opt out from the system entirely, while the disease scope would 
reflect the wording of the Doha Declaration.  
 
Under the Chairman’s draft, countries importing generic pharmaceutical 
products and using the paragraph 6 mechanism would be expected to take measures to 
prevent re-exportation, provided such measures were ‘reasonable’, ‘within their 
means’ and ‘proportionate’ to their administrative capacities and the risk of trade 
diversion. Exporting countries would be obliged to require the beneficiary company 
of the compulsory licence (1) to export their entire production to the countries needed 
and (2) to clearly identify the products through labelling or marking and through 
special colouring or shaping of the products themselves. 
 
At the informal TRIPS Council meeting on 17 December 2002, Ambassador 
Motta made it clear that the US had little option but to accept or reject the 
compromise text contained in the Chairman’s draft.96 Developing countries, including 
India, Brazil and Kenya signalled a willingness to accept the Chairman’s draft, much 
to the dismay of some NGOs, provided there was no move to further limit the scope 
                                                 
93 Harvey E. Bale, ‘The Conflicts Between Parallel Trade and Product Access and Innovation: The 
Case of Pharmaceuticals’, 1 JIEL 637 (1998). 
94 Bartelt, above n. 10, at 307. 
95 ‘Main Elements of the Chair’s 16 December 2002 Draft Compromise Decision (Perez Motta Text)’, 
European Commission (Trade and Development) Press Release, 9 January 2003, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/csc/memo090103_en.htm (visited 14 January 2003). 
96 ‘US Faces Touch Choice’, BNA WTO Reporter, 18 December 2002: 
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/wto.nsf/is/A0A6G2B6C2 (visited at 18 December 2002). 
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of diseases.97 But when the TRIPS Council met formally on 20 December 2002, the 
effective deadline for the conclusion of paragraph 6 negotiations, there was deadlock. 
The US blocked an agreement on grounds that the scope of coverage in the 
Chairman’s draft was too broad and went beyond the focus of HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria.98 The US felt that the compromise text could be interpreted 
as meaning that drug patents could be ignored on treatments for a wide range of 
diseases.99 Negotiations were suspended and Ambassador Motta asked WTO 
Members to resume negotiations and report to the next meeting of the TRIPS Council, 
which took place on 10 February 2003. 
 
F.  EC compromise text 
 
In the interim, on 9 January 2003, the EC launched a new initiative to break the 
deadlock.100 The EC proposal was to remove WTO constraints requiring compulsory 
licences to be ‘predominantly’ for domestic supply in the case of medicines to combat 
a limited list of 22 infectious diseases (including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria) that are generally recognised by health experts to have the most damaging 
impact on developing countries. Mèdecines Sans Frontières101 criticised this proposal 
on grounds that virtually all major African diseases for which there are patented 
medicines have been excluded from the list, with almost all the list’s diseases 
comprising those for which there is no drug treatment, or where existing treatments 
are already off patent. But the EC proposal did contain the safeguard that, for any 
health concern not explicitly covered by the initial list, WTO Members wishing to 
import medicines under compulsory licence terms would be encouraged to seek WHO 
advice before doing so.102 Involving the WHO, with its public health expertise, was 
seen as a way of ensuring that the Doha Declaration could be used in good faith.  
 
The TRIPS Council on 10 February 2003 failed to take the issue much further, 
the meeting lasting only two hours and ending in deadlock with no party willing to 
relinquish its key demands. At the next TRIPS Council meeting on 4-5 June 2003, 
attempts were made to break the deadlock in the form of Communications submitted 
by the European Communities and their Member States and by the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) states. The EC Communication stressed that full advantage should 
be taken of the available expertise on health matters, particularly from the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), in relation to implementing the Doha Declaration, and 
made clear that the principles of the Doha Declaration should be carried through to 
issues other than compulsory licensing or parallel imports, such as ‘exceptions to 
                                                 
97 ‘US Sticks to Hard Line on TRIPS, as Supachai Tries to Broker Deal’, Inside US Trade, 20 
December 2002. 
98 According to Ismail, above n. 4, at 398 the US Delegation could not obtain the mandate it needed 
from PhRMA to agree to the proposed solution. 
99 ‘Consensus on TRIPS Unravels as US Blocks Deal on Scope of Diseases’ Inside US Trade, 3 
January 2002; see also ‘US Wrecks Cheap Drugs Deal: Cheney’s Intervention Blocks Pact to Help 
Poor Countries After Pharmaceutical Firms Lobby White House’, The Guardian, 21 December 2002: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,864071,00.html (visited 21 December 2002). 
100 ‘EU Seeks to Break the Current Deadlock on WTO Access to Medicines: a multilateral solution is 
needed’, European Commission (Trade and Development) Press Release, 9 January 2003, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/csc/pr090103_en.htm (visited 14 January 2003). 
101 Médecins Sans Frontières ‘Reneging on Doha’, An MSF analysis of recent attempts to restrict 
developing counties’ use of compulsory licensing to a set list of diseases, (2003) mimeo. 
102 The idea of a WHO-certified public health crisis had earlier been suggested by Arvind Subramanian 
of the International Monetary Fund, above n. 19, at 328. 
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exclusive rights or other policy options’.103 This latter statement left open the 
possibility of future EC support for an Article 30 based solution to the paragraph 6 
problem in the future. The ACP Communication expressed disappointment at the 
failure to reach agreement on the 16 December 2002 Motta text and highlighted the 
need for technical assistance, in particular from the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO), the WTO and the WHO.104 The June TRIPS Council meeting 
ended without any substantial progress on a solution. However, following the June 
meeting, reports began to appear that the United States was prepared to abandon its 
earlier insistence that a paragraph 6 solution cover only specific diseases (namely 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria), shifting its focus from disease coverage to 
limitations on eligibility aimed at low-income developing countries and least-
developed nations, together with safeguards against the risk of commercial export of 
low-cost medicines into other markets.105 This shift in the position of the United 
States was crucial in securing agreement on a Decision of the WTO General Council, 
designed to resolve the issue, at the end of August 2003. 
 
G. The August 2003 Decision on implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
 
The final breakthrough was achieved when Ambassador Motta’s successor as 
Chairman of the TRIPS Council, Vanu Gopala Menon of Singapore, met with a small 
group of WTO Members to negotiate a solution to paragraph 6. This group, 
comprising the United States, Kenya, Brazil, South Africa and India, succeeded in 
producing a draft Decision on 21 August 2003, followed by a revised draft, almost 
identical to the original version, on 26 August. Following approval by the TRIPS 
Council on 28 August, the General Council of the WTO was then presented with a 
final draft of the Decision on implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, 
which it adopted on 30 August 2003.106 
 
The Decision provides for a temporary waiver of Members’ obligations under 
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement, of the type discussed above in section IV.B of 
this article, until such time as that article is amended.107 Pharmaceutical products 
covered by the Decision include any patented product, or product manufactured 
through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address public 
health problems as recognised by paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration. This explicitly 
includes active ingredients necessary for their manufacture and diagnostic kits needed 
for their use. 
 
                                                 
103 The Implementation of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and PublicHealth, 
Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, IP/C/W/402, 24 June 2003. 
104 Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Communication 
from the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), IP/C/W/401, 28 May 2003. 
105 ‘Industry to Unveil Cheap Drugs Plan’, Guy de Jonguières, Financial Times, 23 June 2003; ‘US 
Rumoured to Consider Change in Tactic on TRIPS and Health’, Bridges Weekly Trade Digest, 3 July 
2003, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-07-03/story4.htm (visited 3 July 2003). 
106 ‘Cheap Drugs Deal Agreed as US Lifts Veto’, Frances Williams, Financial Times, 1 September 
2003, 8. 
107 Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, 
IP/C/W/405, 30 August 2003, http://www/wto/org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm 
(visited 1 September 2003). 
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Countries eligible to import under the agreement include any least-developed 
WTO Member and any other Member that has notified the TRIPS Council if its 
intention to use the system as an importer, it being understood that a Member may 
notify at any time that it will use the system in whole or in a limited way, for example 
only in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or 
in cases of public non-commercial use. A number of Members (Hong Kong China, 
Israel, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Turkey and 
the United Arab Emirates) have stated that, if they use the system, it will only be in 
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency (this 
statement carrying with it the significant implication that other Members may use the 
system more liberally in circumstances other than in situations of national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency). Furthermore, as regards applicant states 
for European Union membership, until their accession the Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia 
have all agreed that they will only use the system as importers in situations of national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency and, upon their accession to the 
EU, will opt out of using the system as importers altogether. In addition, footnote 3 to 
paragraph 1(b) of the Decision carries a list of developed country Members that will 
from the outset opt out of using the system as importers entirely.108 As regards 
countries allowed to sanction the manufacture and export of low-cost essential 
medicines under the system, the Decision makes it clear that any Member may use the 
system set out in the Decision to produce pharmaceutical products for, and export 
them to, an eligible importing country. 
 
The Decision then goes on to set out a number of safeguards designed to 
ensure that cheap drugs manufactured under compulsory licensing arrangements and 
intended for developing countries are not diverted to developed country markets. 
These anti-diversion measures require that medicines made available under the 
scheme be a different shape and colour from those sold for profit in developed 
country markets, while the TRIPS Council will review periodically whether the 
licensing arrangements are being abused. 
 
A separate statement by WTO General Council Chairman Carlos Pérez del 
Castillo, then describes Members’ ‘shared understanding’ that the Decision will be 
interpreted and implemented on a ‘good faith’ basis in order to deal with public health 
problems and not for industrial or commercial policy objectives, and that issues such 
as preventing the medicines getting into the wrong hands are important.109 It also 
stresses that Members recognise that the purpose of the Decision would be defeated if 
products supplied under its arrangements were diverted from markets for which they 
are intended and that all reasonable measures should be taken to prevent such 
diversion, such as special packaging and/or colouring or shaping of medicines and 
that such measures should not have a significant impact on price. Examples of ‘best 
practice’, based on existing anti-trade diversion detection measures already taken by 
donor pharmaceutical companies, are appended to the statement. The statement then 
                                                 
108 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
109 The General Council Chairperson’s statement on implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, 30 August 2003, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm (visited 9 September 2003).  
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goes on the stress the role of the TRIPS Council in settling disputes arising from these 
arrangements expeditiously and amicably, with the TRIPS Council explicitly given a 
new role in reviewing notifications made under the system and all information 
gathered on implementation of the Decision included in the TRIPS Council annual 
review of the Decision. 
 
However, concerns remain that the added costs associated with altering 
packaging, pill size and colour will have a detrimental effect on the availability of 
essential medicines in developing countries, reducing the incentives for generic drug 
companies, which will find it less cost-efficient to produce identifiable pills, while 
there are also concerns that the administrative burden associated with the procedural 
arrangements for notifying the WTO of its decision to use the mechanism and 
undergo TRIPS Council scrutiny will result in lengthy delays and prove costly for 
developing country governments.  
 
There are also concerns that the Decision, which has been warmly welcomed 
by the Office of the United States Trade Representative,110 the European Union,111 the 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA)112 and 
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA),113 sets out 
burdensome procedural arrangements. The new arrangements will require that the 
importing country first attempt to obtain a voluntary licence from the patent holder on 
reasonable commercial terms for a reasonable period. If this is not possible, the 
importing country must then assess its generic industry’s capacity to produce the 
medicine locally and, if capacity is deemed insufficient, then notify the WTO with a 
detailed justification of its decision. The importing country must then notify a 
potential importer, which must in turn seek a voluntary licence and, failing that, must 
seek a compulsory licence from its own government on a single-country basis, with 
compensation payable on standards of reasonableness in the importing country. 
Conversely, there are still some lingering concerns for individual companies operating 
in the proprietary pharmaceutical industry that some high- and middle-income 
developing countries will not opt out from the arrangements. 
 
The Decision is likely to have far-reaching consequences. At an institutional 
level, it re-defines the role of the TRIPS Council, which will now routinely scrutinise 
the use of compulsory licences by WTO Members by evaluating the terms of 
individual licences and whether or not local manufacturing capacity is insufficient. As 
such, the Decision opens a new chapter in the activities of the TRIPS Council. At an 
operational level, the Decision introduces a new level of differentiation between 
developing countries to an extent not previously seen in the TRIPS Agreement and 
                                                 
110 ‘Statement of US Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick Following Agreement in WTO on 
Access to Medicines’, 30 August 2003, http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/08/2003-08-30-rbz-
statement.htm (visited 11 September 2003). 
111 ‘Access to Essential Medicines: EU Strongly Welcomes WTO Deal on Generic Medicines’, 30 
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112 ‘EFPIA Statement on Compulsory License for Export (“Paragraph 6” of Doha Declaration on 
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113 ‘Statement from Shannon Herzfeld, PhRMA’s Senior Vice President, International Affairs in 
relation to successful conclusion of the negotiations on TRIPS and Public Health’, 30 August 2003, 
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also carries with it a number of uncertainties and additional obstacles for those WTO 
Members seeking to avail themselves of the new procedures. However, the Decision 
does mark a step back from the more restrictive interpretation of a paragraph 6 
solution advocated by the EU and US in earlier negotiations. The arrangements 
outlined in the final text of the Decision do not limit the scope of diseases, nor as a 
general rule require a national emergency such as an epidemic to be identified before 
compulsory licences can be issued since public health problems can now routinely be 
dealt with under the agreed arrangements. Yet, aside from the institutional and 
operational consequences of the Decision, one of its most far-reaching consequences 
may well be the legacy that negotiations will leave in terms of providing the stimulus 
for policy alternatives to a Doha-based solution. 
  
V.  Policy alternatives to a Doha-based solution 
 
A.  Pharmaceutical companies as donors of essential medicines 
 
A significant alternative to a Doha-based solution is emerging due to the fact that 
pharmaceutical companies are facing investor pressure to exhibit good practice. On 24 
March 2003, for instance, ISIS Asset Management and the UK Universities 
Superannuation Scheme (USS) published an investor statement urging pharmaceutical 
companies and governments to improve access to medicines in developing countries. 
The investor statement was accompanied by a framework of good practice by which 
to assess pharmaceutical companies’ commitment to improving public health in the 
developing world by observing sensitivity to local circumstances when enforcing 
patents or granting licences. It also advocated using influence with governments to 
encourage measures to address public health crises, such as through government 
contributions to the Global Health Fund (see sub-section D, below).114 
 
Some pharmaceutical companies have responded with donations of medicines 
to developing countries free of charge.115 However, the slow take up of such offers by 
governments in sub-Saharan Africa is puzzling. Since 2000 only two African 
countries (Uganda and Botswana) have accepted an offer by German pharmaceutical 
company Boehringer Ingelheim to provide free donations of nevirapine, an anti-
retroviral drug sold under the brand name Viramune and designed to prevent pregnant 
women suffering from the HIV/AIDS virus infecting their unborn babies.116 This low 
take up may be due to continuing scepticism about the efficacy of nevirapine, 
particularly in South Africa, but may also indicate that complicated bureaucracy on 
the part of the donor company, an absence of political commitment by developing 
country governments, shortcomings in local healthcare systems and problems with 
distribution channels may all create significant barriers to access for essential 
medicines.117 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 The Guardian ‘Investors Pressure Drug Firms on Pricing’, 25 March 2003, 12. 
115 For examples see Rozek, above n. 4, at 912. 
116 ‘Only Two African States Take Up Aids Offer’, Geoff Dyer, Financial Times, 14 July 2003, 8. 
117 See also Bourgeois and Burns, above n. 3, at 839. 
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B.  Differential pricing and the prevention of trade diversion 
 
  1.  Parallel importation 
 
One solution that would stop short of creating a developing country dependence on 
corporate donations of free medicines, while acknowledging the inability of patients 
in developing countries to pay developed world prices for patented essential 
medicines, would be for pharmaceutical companies to simply provide cheap drugs to 
alleviate public health crisis in developing countries. Drug companies are, for 
instance, offering price reductions of up to 75 per cent for anti-retroviral drugs to 
combat the virus in developing countries.118 But problems arise because the doctrine 
of international exhaustion of rights, embodied in the TRIPS Agreement and 
confirmed in the Doha Declaration, can lead to parallel importation. Parallel 
importation occurs when products made and marketed by the patent owner in one 
country are imported into another country without the approval of the patent owner, 
normally in order to take advantage of differential pricing between the two countries, 
whereby different prices are available for the same product in different markets.119 
This becomes problematic for initiatives designed to promote access to affordable 
medicines required to address public health crises in developing countries where there 
is a substantial risk that low-cost, differentially priced, medicines made available in 
developing countries will be diverted back into more lucrative developed country 
markets where they can be sold for higher prices. 
  
Under rules of international exhaustion, set out in Article 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, a patentee’s rights are exhausted as soon as the patented product is put on 
the market either by the patentee or with his consent. The result is that a patent cannot 
prevent the marketing or importation of the goods by others once it has been placed 
on the market with the consent of the patentee.120 This rule prevails since Article 6 of 
the TRIPS Agreement merely provides that ‘nothing in this Agreement shall be used 
to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights’. This principle 
has been is confirmed by paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Declaration, which states that 
‘the effect of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to establish its 
own regime for such exhaustion without challenge…’.121 The effect of international 
exhaustion, as established by Article 6 of the TRIPs Agreement, may well be, 
therefore, to dissuade patent holders from offering their products at low cost in 
developing countries. 
 
There is also an associated risk of transparency for global pharmaceutical 
companies involved with differential pricing initiatives in that supplying low-cost 
drugs to developing countries could lead customers in the developed world to notice 
that they were paying, for example, $100 per kilo as opposed to the developing 
                                                 
118 Bale, above n. 93, at 1; Rozek and Rainey, above n. 3, at 477; Subramanian, above n. 19, at 330; 
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119 See also Bartelt, above n. 10, at 304. 
120 See also Marco M. Slotboom, ‘The Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights: Different 
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country price of $10 per kilo for identical medicines, with resultant public pressure to 
lower prices in developed world markets. Furthermore, uncontrolled re-exports of 
low-cost medicines from developing countries back into developed world may also 
lead to a downward pressure on prices in the latter markets.122 Although Rozek argues 
that the existence of differential prices for pharmaceutical products is not necessarily 
a cause for concern and are an efficient means for pharmaceutical companies to 
recover research and development costs,123 it is more generally acknowledged that 
pharmaceutical companies would ‘rather avoid large differentials in prices across 
markets because of the pressure from taxpayers and consumers in their own markets 
who see the price differential as being unfair to them’.124 
 
  2. The EU Regulation to prevent diversion of trade in low-cost essential medicines 
 
The fact that Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement leaves each Member free to establish 
its own regime of exhaustion of rights creates a structural weakness, which acts as a 
disincentive for the provision of donated or low-cost patented medicines to 
developing countries. The European Union operates its own regional exhaustion of 
rights doctrine, so imports of cheaper patented medicines from outside the EU are 
prohibited. This has made it possible for the EU to put in place safeguards to deter 
diversion of trade in essential medicines that have been made available at low cost or, 
donated free of charge, by patent holding proprietary pharmaceutical companies. As 
such, the EU arrangements differ from the system agreed by the WTO in its Decision 
on a paragraph 6 solution of 30 August 2003, the latter being designed to deter trade 
diversion in circumstances where generic drug producers manufacture and export to 
developing countries low-cost medicines under compulsory licensing conditions. As 
the EU and WTO systems take effect, however, it will be interesting to compare the 
effectiveness of each set of arrangements as they operate alongside each other, at least 
as far as WTO Members from EU countries are concerned. 
 
The details of the EU arrangements were agreed on 23 May 2003, when the 
Council of the European Union took steps to stop low-cost medicines intended for 
developing countries from being re-imported into Europe by adopting a Council 
Regulation, under which exporting companies are invited to apply to the European 
Commission for permission to put their medicines to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
tuberculosis and related opportunistic diseases onto a ‘tiered’ price list, selling them 
to developing countries at a minimum of a quarter of the average factory price in 
OECD or at the cost of production plus a 15 per cent margin.125 The Regulation 
prohibits the re-importation of these drugs into the EU from 76 least developed and 
developing countries listed in Annex II. The products on the list then carry a logo – 
the winged staff of Aesculapius with a coiled serpent in the centre of a circle formed 
                                                 
122 See also Reichman, above n. 12, at 15. 
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by 12 stars – as depicted in Annex V of the Regulation - allowing easy identification 
by customs authorities examining imported goods at EU borders.126  
 
In fact, it was the EU that proposed similar safeguards be put in place at WTO 
level with generic producers and importers using compulsory licensing provisions 
taking necessary measures to prevent trade diversion, including making medicines 
produced under the exemption clearly distinguishable through labelling, marking and 
packaging.127 Potentially, this pragmatic approach to prevention trade diversion of 
low-cost medicines can have major advantages for recipients of low-cost medicines in 
developing countries. If the EU arrangements work effectively, it may be time to look 
again at the issue of international exhaustion and explicitly to re-open the debate as to 
whether Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement could be revised to provide an effective 
mechanism to prevent the diversion of low-cost or donor drugs supplied by 
proprietary drug companies, and intended for low-income developing countries, back 
into developed country markets. 
  
  3. Preventing the diversion of generic drugs produced under compulsory licensing 
 
Although the matter is not clearly settled, it is highly unlikely that parallel importation 
under the doctrine of exhaustion applies in the case of the separate problem of 
pharmaceutical products produced under compulsory licensing conditions.128 But, 
even though the situation regarding generic drugs produced under a compulsory 
licence would be likely to differ from the situation with low-cost or donor drugs 
produced by proprietary pharmaceutical companies, since the patent holder would not 
have given consent to the marketing of a generic drug, there has traditionally been an 
expectation that the right holder would be able to block importation of generics 
manufactured under compulsory licences.129 However, in reality, the situation may 
well be that, particularly where a product is manufactured under a compulsory licence 
for export, diversion of the product away from the developing country market that it 
was intended for and into developed countries instead, where higher prices can be 
charged, may undermine the market for the patented version of the product. The EU 
initiative may therefore have usefulness in terms of preventing the export of generic 
medicines produced under compulsory licences into developed country markets that 
goes well beyond the original objective of the Regulation if a similar uniform 
identification and registration procedure could be set up at WTO level, in effect a 
tightening of the arrangements designed to prevent trade diversion set out in the WTO 
Decision of 30 August which at present leaves the detail of how the system should 
operate to individual importing Member countries. 
  
 
 
                                                 
126 Aesculapius was the Greek God of Medicine. Homer called Aesculapius the ‘blameless physician’. 
According to legend his father, Apollo, gave Aesculapius healing powers that were so powerful that he 
started to raise people from the dead. Unhappy about losing the privilege of immortality, Zeus killed 
Aesculapius with a thunder bolt. 
127 Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, above n. 74, para 5. 
128 Reichman, above n. 12, at 16. 
129 Bartelt, above n. 10, at 305. See also Reichman, above n. 12, at 16, for a discussion of differing 
views on whether importing states have the right to treat products initially sold under a compulsory 
licence in the exporting state as parallel imports for the purposes of Article 31 and Paragraph 5(d) of 
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C.  Public private partnerships 
 
An alternative to developing country dependence on donations or access to low-cost 
essential medicines from global pharmaceutical companies is emerging in the form of 
public-private partnerships (PPPs). As a model for initiating research into developing 
country diseases, PPPs reduce the need to tackle the reform of intellectual property 
systems as a prerequisite to improving public health. Under the PPP model, 
companies provide technology, as well as development and distribution expertise, 
while public sector partners fund development costs and help to ensure that medicines 
and vaccines get to people that need them. This, argue the advocates of PPPs, has the 
double benefit of encouraging R&D and accelerating the product’s uptake in the 
developing world.130 Following the recommendation of the CIPR report that public 
funding for research on health problems in developing countries should be 
increased,131 the UK Government’s response was that it recognised that a range of 
public policies were required to help alleviate health problems in developing countries 
and that public funding was an important element of this overall strategy.132 The UK 
Government has already demonstrated a willingness to provide public funding to help 
create PPPs, a recent example being the announcement by GlaxoSmithKlein (GSK) 
that it plans to launch the drug Lapdap (chlorpoguanil/dapsone) for the treatment of 
malaria. The Lapdap initiative, the result of a partnership initiative between GSK, the 
WHO, the University of Liverpool, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, received funding of £2.5 million from the UK Government’s Department 
for International Development (DFID). 
 
D.  The Global Fund 
 
What the efforts of corporate donors and public-private partnerships do, in many 
respects, is to illustrate that a Doha-based solution is only part of a range of policy 
approaches designed to achieve the overall goal of improving standards of healthcare 
in developing countries through a mix of mechanisms involving corporate donors, 
public money and public-private partnerships. With financing of essential medicines 
programmes a real problem in developing countries133 there is a wider need for the 
Doha negotiations to be accompanied by global commitment to financing health 
improvements in developing countries.134 One practical embodiment of this 
commitment is the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,135 set up in 
2001 to finance programmes for epidemics in developing countries. In his State of the 
Union address on 28 January 2003, President George W. Bush committed himself to 
asking the United States Congress to authorise up to $1bn per year for five years for 
the Global Fund but, even with France announcing its intention to triple donations to 
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the Global Fund to $150m per year and UK committed to donating $45m per annum, 
co-ordinated action from the European Union has so far been absent and the Global 
Fund is already suffering from a shortfall. The G8 countries have been criticised for 
not increasing their financial contributions, despite pledging to strengthen efforts to 
fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in its action plan on health on 2 June 
2003.136 Around $450m is needed to finance the proposals from developing countries 
that the Fund intends to approve in October 2003 and a further $3bn would be needed 
to meet likely commitments before the end of 2004.137 A further commitment to the 
Global Fund, particularly by the EU, is essential if its objectives are to be met. 
 
E.  The World Health Assembly 
 
In a move related to the Doha negotiations, at the 56th World Health Assembly in May 
2003, proposals from Brazil, on behalf of developing countries,138 and from the 
United States,139 resulted in the adoption of a Resolution on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Innovation and Public Health.140 The Resolution provides for the setting up a 
body which appears akin to the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
(CIPR), and instructs the WHO to establish the terms of reference for an appropriate 
time-limited expert body to collect data and produce an analysis of intellectual 
property rights, innovation and public health, including the question of appropriate 
funding and incentive mechanisms for the creation of new medicines and other 
products against diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries. The 
Resolution provides for submitting a progress report to the 57th World Health 
Assembly and a final report with concrete proposals to the Executive Board of the 
WHO at its 115th session in January 2005. Although this involvement for the WHO in 
the intellectual property and public health debate remains at the preparatory stages, 
this initiative nevertheless marks a potentially significant shift in the activities of the 
World Health Organisation in this area.141  
 
VI.  Conclusions: risks and opportunities for the future 
 
It is somewhat ironic that, in the final instance, it was US refusal to the accept the 
Chairman’s compromise text on 20 December 2002 that led the deadline set by 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration to be missed. In many respects it was developing 
countries, not the US, which had most to lose by demonstrating a willingness to agree 
to the Chairman’s draft. But the change in approach on the part of the United States in 
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August 2003 ultimately meant that agreement, in the form of the 30 August Decision, 
could be put in place, albeit with additional procedural safeguards to those suggested 
the previous December. NGOs, generic drug companies142 and international 
institutions played a significant role in seeking to re-define and re-align the rules of 
international intellectual property law, at one point during the negotiations Eric 
Noehrenberg of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association even complaining that countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Hungary and 
India with strong generic drug industries had ‘hijacked’ and ‘subverted’ the paragraph 
6 process by promoting the availability of off-patent medicines in all developing 
countries, in doing so preventing progress on reaching the intended beneficiaries in 
countries with low incomes or insufficient manufacturing capacities.143 But ultimately 
the outcome, characterised by the dominance of the US and the EU as key 
institutional actors, coupled with the reluctance of developing country governments to 
ultimately oppose the US approach in the face of negotiating fatigue and the threat of 
bilateral trade sanctions, is remarkably familiar and repeats the patterns of earlier 
negotiations.144 
 
But despite the WTO Decision of 30 August 2003, the stakes remain high. 
One potential adverse impact of accepting a system that may lead to more frequent 
recourse to compulsory licensing may, of course, be a continuation of the dearth of 
research into diseases of particular importance to developing countries, such as 
malaria and drug-resistant tuberculosis. The presumption that greater patent protection 
in developing countries under the terms of the TRIPS Agreement would result in 
increased levels of research into tropical diseases, with the prospect of significant 
financial rewards for pharmaceutical companies holding key patents would, argues 
Sykes, be likely to be undermined by a more liberal interpretation of TRIPS 
provisions on compulsory licensing and parallel importation.145 There remains a risk 
that a pharmaceutical company considering investing in research and development 
into diseases that particularly affect developing countries might consider this unviable 
in commercial terms if compulsory licences are subsequently awarded and 
importation allowed into the affected area with only reduced compensatory payments 
awarded to the patent holder.146 
 
There is also the risk that the US remains prepared to take tough unilateral 
action if developing countries try to use cheap generic drugs. This is a form of the 
‘TRIPS-plus’ bilateral action outlined by Drahos,147 while a further manifestation of 
TRIPS-plus might well occur through the introduction of bilateral trade agreements, 
such as the draft Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA),148 namely a ratcheting up 
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of standards to limit compulsory licensing through trade agreements outside the remit 
of the WTO. Developing countries may well be prepared to sign such agreements in 
order to avoid losing access to developed country markets.149 
 
But, as well as risks, the future also holds out opportunities, particularly for 
least-developed countries. From 2005 onwards, when patents for pharmaceuticals will 
be extended to developing countries, least-developed nations will remain the only 
group of WTO Members that will retain transitional arrangements with respect to the 
obligation to provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals, until 2016. This extension 
for least-developed countries exists as a result of Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement 
and the associated extension of the deadline in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, subsequently adopted as a Decision of the TRIPS 
Council to this effect on 1 July 2002.150 As a result, there is now anecdotal evidence 
that several leading Indian generic drug manufacturers are considering moving their 
operations to Bangladesh to take advantage of the least-developed country status (and 
associated longer transitional periods) in that country.151 
 
Yet despite the potential short-term benefits for some least-developed 
countries, the reality is that the debate about the Doha Declaration and compulsory 
licensing is part of a much wider structural problem in development policy.152 
Improving health care systems and public health awareness via education 
programmes, plus new research into treatments for diseases prevalent in developing 
countries will all be crucial. In many respects, one of the key achievements of the 
negotiations that have followed the Doha Declaration is probably on a political 
level,153 refocusing attention on the severity of the public health problems facing 
developing countries, with the resultant investor pressure on pharmaceutical 
companies to enter into donor initiatives and public private partnerships. Overall, 
solutions are likely to emerge as much from pragmatic initiatives and incremental 
steps as from the legal undertakings on an acceptable form of words to resolve the 
process initiated by paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, agreed in the WTO 
Decision of 30 August 2003. The actions of corporate donors and public-private 
partnerships are part of this solution, as are increased contributions of public money to 
the Global Fund. Alongside these initiatives, it may well be that regulatory activity 
such as the European Union Regulation, taking advantage of the EU doctrine of 
regional exhaustion by linking low-cost and donor medicines to measures taken by 
customs EU officials to prevent re-importation of these drugs into the EU from a pre-
determined list of 76 least-developed and developing countries, is the type of measure 
that has the potential to address public health crises in the developing world by 
preventing the diversion of trade medicines intended for developing countries. 
Perhaps such initiatives can even achieve as much as the painful and protracted 
negotiations between WTO Members on how best to ensure access to essential 
medicines in developing countries by means of a solution to the paragraph 6 problem 
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of the Doha Declaration that have taken up so much time and energy over the past two 
years. 
